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FOREwoRD: TERRORISM ON TRIAL

Michael P. Schar/ and Amy E. Millertt
I
On December 21, 1988, Pan Am 103 exploded over Lockerbie,
Scotland, killing 259 passengers and crew members as well as eleven
residents of the small Scottish town. With the exception of the attacks of
September 11, 2001, this was the worst case of air terrorism ever committed
on Western soil and the Scottish and American authorities responded by
launching the largest international criminal investigation ever undertaken.
It took three years for the investigators to piece together what happened and
who they believed to be responsible. At first the evidence pointed toward
Iran as the culprit, then the trail seemed to lead to a Syrian based terrorist
organization. But in 1991, the United States and United Kingdom issued
indictments against two Libyan agents for the Lockerbie bombing, which
had allegedly been undertaken in revenge for the U.S. bombing of Tripoli in
1986. It required another eight years of shuttle diplomacy to work out a
deal between the United Nations, the United States, the United Kingdom,
and Libya to bring the accused perpetrators to trial before a panel of three
Scottish judges sitting at a retired U.S. air force base known as Camp Zeist
in The Netherlands, with the case prosecuted by Scottish Barristers assisted
by U.S. prosecutors.
After a nine-month trial, the Lockerbie court acquitted one of the two
defendants outright, and the judgment acknowledged that there were many
holes in the prosecution's case against the other defendant, Abdelbaset AlMegrahi, who was nonetheless found guilty of the bombing of the airliner.
It is noteworthy, however, that the judges unequivocally determined that the
crime was committed in the course of the defendant's duties as a Libyan
intelligence agent, leaving no question that they believed that the
government of Libya was behind the bombing. But conspicuously absent
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from the judgment was an indication of how high up in Libya this
responsibility went, and whether other States, such as Syria and Iran, also
played a role as many experts continue to suspect.
The mixed verdict and limited findings in the Lockerbie case have left
the public questioning whether the trial succeeded in achieving justice and
truth. But perhaps a more important measure for judging the success of the
Lockerbie trial is the extent to which it contributed to peace and security.
The Lockerbie trial must be viewed in the context of the thirty-yearlong, low-intensity conflict between Libya and the United States. When
Colonel Muammar Gaddafi came to power in 1969, Libya nationalized U.S.
corporate-owned oil wells and refineries and began to support anti-Western
terrorist organizations. In the early 1980s, the Reagan administration
conducted naval and air exercises off the coast of Libya, provoking the first
of several minor military confrontations. Then, when terrorists detonated a
bomb in the LaBelle Discotheque in Germany, killing several American
servicemen, the Reagan administration claimed that Libya was behind the
bombing and launched a surprise airstrike on Gaddafi's residence in
Tripoli, which injured his son and killed his infant daughter.
The verdict in the Lockerbie case confirmed the U.S. government's
charge that the bombing of Pan Am 103 in 1988 was undertaken by Libyan
agents in retaliation for the 1986 U.S. airstrike on Tripoli. When evidence
of Libyan involvement first came to light in 1991, officials throughout the
U.S. government debated the best way to respond. It was generally agreed
that a military operation to engineer a regime change would be too costly in
terms of lives, resources, and diplomatic capital. Instead, a decision was
made to employ the mechanism of criminal prosecution.
But achieving justice was never the main objective of this scheme.
The fact that the United States issued a public, rather than a sealed,
indictment indicates that U.S. authorities had low expectations that the
accused would ever actually be brought to trial. Instead, U.S. officials saw
the indictment itself as a diplomatic tool that would help them persuade
members of the Security Council to impose sanctions on Libya, thereby
furthering their goal of isolating and weakening a rogue regime. The socalled money bomb ended up costing Libya more than $18 billion in lost
revenue during the 1990s.
Choking under the effects of sanctions, Gaddafi ultimately agreed to
surrender the two Libyan defendants to a novel Scottish court sitting in the
Netherlands in a deal that would insulate Gaddafi and other high level
Libyan officials from judicial scrutiny. At this point, with international
support for expanding or even continuing the sanctions quickly fading and
American companies clamoring to regain access to Libyan oil fields, the
Clinton administration viewed a Scottish trial in the Netherlands of the two
Libyan agents as a convenient way to put the Lockerbie incident behind it.
Despite its inadequacies, the judicial response did succeed in severing
the cycle of violence between the United States and Libya. It prompted
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Libya to terminate its support for terrorist groups, to dismantle its chemical
weapons program, to acknowledge responsibility for the Pan Am 103
bombing, and to pay billions of dollars to the families of the victims to
settle the pending law suits. International sanctions have been lifted against
Libya, and U.S.-Libyan relations have begun to normalize. Consequently,
from the standpoint of U.S. security interests, the Lockerbie trial was a
tremendous success.
The United States initially viewed the Lockerbie strategy as providing
a useful model for effectively dealing with other terrorist incidents without
having to resort to a costly military campaign. Thus, after the bombings of
the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the attack on the
U.S.S. Cole in Yemen in 1999, the United States issued a public indictment
against Osama bin Laden and obtained Security Council sanctions against
Afghanistan (from whose territory bin Laden's al Qaeda organization
operated) -- the same strategy it had employed in response to the Pan Am
103 bombing. But the September 11, 2003 attacks by al Qaeda against the
World Trade Center and Pentagon triggered a seismic shift in the U.S.
approach to dealing with terrorists. Rather than seeking to bring terrorists
to justice through indictments, economic sanctions, and criminal trials
following the Lockerbie model, U.S. policy after 9/11 became, in the words
of President Bush, to "bring justice to the terrorists" -- by hunting them
down or detaining them indefinitely as enemy combatants or prosecuting
them in military commissions.
While the Lockerbie approach is currently out of vogue, are there
nonetheless lessons from Lockerbie that policy makers can draw on in
determining how to best use law as a weapon against terrorism in the
future? To explore this important and timely question, the Frederick K.
Cox International Law Center assembled a group of high level United
Nations officers, former U.S. government officials, noted prosecutors and
defense counsel, and prominent journalists and scholars for a day-long
symposium at Case Western Reserve University School of Law on October
8, 2004, entitled "Terrorism on Trial." The conference, which was cosponsored by the American Society of International Law, the American
Branch of the International Law Association, and the International
Association of Penal Law, consisted of five panels: (1) "Use of Force
Versus Use of Courts in the War on Terrorism"; (2) "Is Terrorism Worth
Defining?" (3) "Lessons Learned from the Pan Am 103 Bombing Trial";
(4) "Suing Terrorists in U.S. Court"; and (5) "The Trials of al Qaeda:
Federal Court Versus Military Commission." This special two volume
issue of the Case Journal of InternationalLaw contains twenty articles
generated by this conference, which we believe make a significant
contribution to the literature on the legal response to terrorism.
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II
The symposium began with a Keynote Address by Professor M. Cherif
Bassiouni, Distinguished Research Professor of Law and President of the
International Human Rights Law Institute at DePaul University College of
Law. Professor Bassiouni is currently the U.N. Special Rapporteur for
Afghanistan, and served previously as the Chairman of the U.N.
Commission to Investigate International Humanitarian Law Violations in
the Former Yugoslavia and as the Chairman of the Drafting Committee of
the Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court. In his article, "Terrorism: The Persistent Dilemma of
Legitimacy,"' Professor Bassiouni provocatively observes that trials are not
always held to establish the truth; sometimes they are designed to cover up
the truth. Professor Bassiouni suggests that was the case with the Pan Am
103 trial, which was specifically designed, with the agreement of the United
States, United Kingdom, United Nations and Libya, to avoid exposing the
role that Iran and Syria, as well as high level Libyan officials, played in the
bombing of the airliner. Professor Bassiouni recognizes that for both the
United States and Libya the Lockerbie trial was a diplomatic success story,
but questions the wisdom and legitimacy of pursuing novel judicial
solutions such as the Lockerbie court on an ad hoc basis. Furthermore, he
reflects on why terrorism has never been defined and calls for a more
effective framework of international law so as to "integrate the several
modalities of international cooperation in penal matters to make the
enforcement system more effective."
David Andrews contributes a high level insider's view into the events
that paved the way for the creation of the Lockerbie trial in "A Thorn on the
Tulip - A Scottish Trial in the Netherlands: The Story behind the Lockerbie
Trial." 2 Mr. Andrews, who is Senior Vice President for Government
Affairs and General Counsel of PepsiCo, Inc., served as State Department
Legal Advisor during the Clinton administration, where he received the
highest civilian award of the State Department, the Distinguished Service
Award, for his lead role in establishing the Pan Am 103 Court. In his
article, Mr. Andrews describes the pivotal role that the Lockerbie trial
played in bringing Libya back "into the fold with the community of
nations" and discusses in depth the events leading up to the consideration
and decision to hold a trial in a third country venue. This novel solution
remedied the UN's authority which had been compromised by "sanctions
fatigue." In a careful analysis, Mr. Andrews explains how the logistical and

' M. Cherif Bassiouni, Terrorism: The Persistent Dilemma of Legitimacy, 36 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 299 (2005).
2 David Andrews, A Thorn on the Tulip - A Scottish Trial in the Netherlands: The Story
behind the Lockerbie Trial, 36 CASE W. RES. J.INT'L L. 307 (2005).
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political considerations of a trial in the Netherlands with a newly elected
Dutch government took great effort, time, and thought to sort out.
The first panel of the symposium focused on the debate between
utilizing force versus the use of the courts in fighting the war on terrorism.
The panelists for this debate included: Lt. Col. Amos Guiora, former Judge
Advocate General of the Israel Defense Forces and Professor of law at Case
Western Reserve University School of Law; Mark Drumbl, Professor and
Ethan Allen Faculty Fellow at Washington & Lee University School of
Law; and Mary Ellen O'Connell, Professor at Moritz College of Law and
Fellow of the Mershon Center for the Study of International Security at the
Ohio State University.
In his article, "Targeted Killing as Active Self-Defense ' 3 Lt. Col.
Guiora examines the legality and policy reasons behind Israel's use of
targeted killing as an active means of self-defense. He argues that current
international law is "ill-equipped to deal with today's terrorists" and
advocates for a new direction in international law that will allow States to
better defend themselves against terrorist attacks, while keeping in mind the
fundamental principles behind the laws of war.
In response, Professor Mark Drumbl's article, "'Lesser Evils' in the
War on Terrorism" 4 discusses the possibility of responding effectively to
criminal attacks by utilizing both force and the courts. Professor Drumbl
keenly advises against conceptualizing the concepts of force and the courts
as mutually exclusive as this creates a misleading dichotomy that does not
exist in reality.
Professor Mary Ellen O'Connell's article, "The Legal Case Against
the Global War on Terror ' 5 focuses on the U.S.' response to terrorism
under the Bush Administration and its self-proclaimed characterization of
its use of force and the courts as part of a "global war." Professor
O'Connell argues that the decision to portray the struggle against terrorism
as a global war and the act of characterizing terrorists as "enemy
combatants" possibly has an "unintended consequence for non-State actors"
by exposing them to a body of international law that was intended for
individuals involved in armed hostilities. Professor O'Connell reveals that
this dangerous precedent has had a ripple effect with Russia also declaring
its own war on terror.
The symposium's second panel discussed the virtues and problems in
attempting to nail down a definition of terrorism and raised the thought
provoking question of whether seeking a definition was even worthwhile.
3 Amos Guiora, Targeted Killing as Active Self-Defense, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
319(2005).
4 Mark Drumbl, 'Lesser Evils' in the War on Terrorism, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 335
(2005).
5 Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Legal CaseAgainst the Global War on Terror, 36 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 349 (2005).
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The panelists, Michael Scharf, Professor of Law and Director of the
Frederick K. Cox International Law Center, Case Western Reserve
University School of Law; Alex Schmid, Senior Crime Prevention &
Criminal Justice Officer for the U.N., Terrorism Prevention Branch in
Vienna, Austria; and Professor Bruce Broomhall, a criminal law professor
at the University of Quebec, participated in a spirited debate as they
provided insight on this important question.
Professor Michael Scharf's article, "Defining Terrorism as the
Peacetime Equivalent of War Crimes: Problems and Prospects, ' 6 critically
examines Alex Schmid's proposal to define terrorism by reference to the
laws of war. The approach is no panacea, he argues, because the laws of
war establish rights as well as obligations for those over whom they apply.
If terrorism is defined as the peacetime equivalent of war crimes, terrorists
could rely on the combatant's privilege, the collateral damage doctrine, and
the obedience to orders defense, and could assert the right to be treated as
POWs.
Alex Schmid's article, "Terrorism - The Definitional Problem ' 7
conducts a fascinating study into how the U.S. government and the
international community currently conceptualize and define terrorism. He
warns against isolating political terrorism from the general political
landscape, stating that violent and non-violent political acts and activists
seek to accomplish a variety of agendas: "[t]hese are all part of the general
repertoire of persuasive political communications and coercive actions
available to participants in the political process." Mr. Schmid emphasizes
that while terrorism must be condemned, it is vital to move past mere
condemnation and intently analyze how terrorism manifests itself in order
to understand it. He also aptly notes that an effort to understand terrorism
in no way indicates an attitude of acceptance.
Professor Bruce Broomhall voices his concern that an attempt to
establish a comprehensive definition of terrorism, without considering the
impact on current international humanitarian law and international human
rights standards and principles, may have grave consequences by
"increasing rather than reducing incoherence in the international system."
In his article, "State Actors in an International Definition of Terrorism
From a Human Rights Perspective," 8 Professor Broomhall analyzes the
potentially harmful effects on human rights within the context of the United
Nations' efforts in negotiating the "Comprehensive Convention on
International Terrorism." He primarily expresses concern that the current
6 Michael P. Scharf, Defining Terrorism as the Peacetime Equivalent of War Crimes:
Problemsand Prospects, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 359 (2005).
7 Alex Schmid, Terrorism - The DefinitionalProblem, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
375

(2005).
8 Bruce Broomhall, State Actors in an International
Definition of Terrorism From a
Human Rights Perspective, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 421 (2005).
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draft under discussion might obligate all States Parties to the Convention
"to cooperate in the prosecution of a wide range of offences that might
represent lawful acts of war committed in internal armed conflict or which
might represent legitimate acts of dissent or resistance when committed in
peacetime (including in states of exception)." 9 Professor Broomhall likens
the Convention, as it is presently designed, to a "blunt policy instrument"
and advises against adopting it for the time being in fear of the negative
repercussions it would invite.
The third panel, entitled "Lessons Learned from the Pan Am 103
Bombing Trial" featured three distinguished speakers intimately familiar
with the proceedings of the Lockerbie trial: Professor John Grant of the
Lewis & Clark School of Law; Julian Knowles, Barrister-at-law, Matrix
Chambers, London and Lockerbie Appeal Defense Counsel; and Steve
Emerson who is the Executive Director of The Investigative Project and the
author of the book "The Fall of Pan Am 103."
Professor Robert Black of the University of Edinburgh, a scheduled
participant in this panel who was not able to attend the conference, authored
an article for this symposium issue based on his personal experiences with
the Lockerbie trial entitled, "Lockerbie: A Satisfactory Process but a
Flawed Result."' 0 Professor Black distills the Lockerbie trial court's ninety
paragraph judgment into an informative explanation of nine factors that
provided the basis for the conviction of Abdelbaset Al-Megrahi. He then
goes on to discuss Megrahi's appeal and the Appeal Court's dismissal of
that claim, arguing that a "shameful miscarriage of justice" persists until an
Appeal Court address three fundamental issues: "(i) whether there was
sufficient evidence to warrant the incriminating findings, (ii) whether any
reasonable trial court could have made those findings ... and (iii) whether
Megrahi's representation at the trial and the appeal was adequate."
From another perspective, Professor John Grant suggests in his article,
"Beyond the Montreal Convention"" that the Lockerbie trial illustrated the
success that domestic criminal justice systems could achieve in adjudicating
"complicated and egregious acts of terrorism."' 2 In his opinion, the core
philosophy of the Montreal Sabotage Convention had the opportunity to
shine due to the flexibility agreed to by the parties and the Security
Council's endorsement of the plan to hold a trial in a neutral third party
venue with a panel of judges in lieu of a jury. Looking at the lessons of the
Lockerbie trial through the lens of the September 11, 2001 tragedy,
Professor Grant argues that with respect to the issues of State-sponsored
terrorism and the harboring and aiding of terrorists by States, modern day
9

1d. at 439.

10

Robert Black, Lockerbie: A Satisfactory Process but a Flawed Result, 36 CASE W. RES.

J. INT'L L. 443 (2005).

11John Grant, Beyond the Montreal Convention, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 453 (2005).
12 1d. at 471.
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terrorism conventions must adopt3 "a multi-faceted approach to what is,
after all, a multi-faceted problem."1
In "The Lockerbie Judgments: A Short Analysis,"' 4 Barrister Julian
Knowles delves into the Lockerbie judgments from the point of view of one
of the lawyers that argued the appeal on behalf of al-Megrahi. Similar to
Robert Black, Knowles reaches the conclusion that "[u]ntil the findings of
the trial court are subjected to a proper and rigorous scrutiny then doubts
about the Lockerbie verdict will remain."' 15 Many of Knowles' concerns
regarding the trial court's conviction of al-Megrahi lie in how the court
interpreted and analyzed the critical evidence offered by a key witness in
the prosecution's case-Tony Gauci. Knowles remarks that the Scottish
Appeals Court admitted that Mr. Gauci did not make a positive
identification of al-Megrahi, yet the court still concluded that it was entitled
to treat Mr. Gauci's
evidence as reliable and as a "highly important element
16
case.'
the
in
Steve Emerson states that notwithstanding the Lockerbie trial's
conclusions, the number of people that believe al-Megrahi coordinated,
planned and executed the Pan Am 103 attack on his own could probably fit
into a phone booth. Switching the focus to another player in the Lockerbie
trial, Mr. Emerson analyzes the role of the Libyan dictator Muammar
Gaddafi in the events surrounding the trial. His article, "The Lockerbie
Terrorist Attack and Libya: A Retrospective Analysis"' 7 examines the trial
from a cost-benefit perspective to determine whether, and to what capacity,
the United States' interests were satisfied. Emerson highlights the fact that
Gaddafi was never found criminally liable for any of the acts surrounding
the bombing of Pan Am 103, and he queries whether the prosecution in the
Lockerbie trial had a viable deterrent effect on Gaddafi's support of
terrorism.
The conference's fourth panel addressed the topic of suing terrorists in
U.S. court and featured three prominent speakers who were involved in the
Lockerbie civil suit: Attorney Mark Zaid, who was the plaintiffs' counsel
representing the families of victims of Pan Am 103; Attorney Robert
Mirone, who was the lead defense counsel for Libya in the Pan Am 103
civil proceedings; and Alan Gerson, former Chief Counsel of the U.S.
mission to the U.N., former Assistant Attorney General, and author of "The
Price of Terror," which tells the inside story of the Lockerbie civil
proceedings.
13

Id.at 472.

14Julian Knowles, The Lockerbie Judgments: A Short Analysis, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L

L. 473 (2005).
1Id.at 484.
161d. at 481.
17Steve Emerson, The Lockerbie TerroristAttack andLibya: A Retrospective Analysis, 36
CASE W. RES. J.INT'L L. 487 (2005).
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In "Bringing Suit Against a Foreign Sovereign,"' 18 Robert Mirone
analyzes the steps that must be taken to wage a legitimate claim against a
sovereign entity within the context of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act. He notes that even though a foreign sovereign may be subject to the
jurisdiction of U.S. courts, it must still be determined who the proper
plaintiff is and which party that plaintiff is entitled to recover damages
from. Mirone critically explores the so-called "Flatow Amendment,"
adopted in the midst of the Pan Am 103 civil proceedings, which modifies
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to permit suit against States that are
included in the Department of State list of terrorist-supporting countries.
Alan Gerson's article, "Merging International Human Rights Law with
Personal Injury Law in the Fight Against Terrorism"' 19 describes the
plaintiffs' strategies and tactics in the litigation against Libya, including the
political effort that resulted in the passage of the Flatow Amendment. Once
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities was amended to allow suit against Libya,
a settlement quickly followed, with Libya ultimately paying several billion
dollars to the families of the tragedy. While some argue that the Flatow
Amendment set a dangerous precedent that can be used in foreign litigation
against the United States, Gerson praises the legislation as a means of
ensuring increased foreign State accountability and a greater opportunity to
achieve justice.
The fifth and final panel of the symposium focused on "The Trials of
al Qaeda: Federal Court Versus Military Commission" with six
distinguished panelists contributing to the debate. Jonathan Leiken, a
former Assistant United States Attorney for the southern district of New
York and adjunct professor at Case; Toni Locy, a reporter for USA Today
covering the Military Commission proceedings against al Qaeda; Andrew
McCarthy, a senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of
Democracies and a former Assistant United States Attorney for the southern
district of New York who prosecuted the first World Trade Center bombing
case; Greg Noone, a Program Officer for the United States Institute of
Peace and former U.S. Navy judge advocate; Scott Silliman, Professor and
Executive Director of Duke University's Center on Law, Ethics & National
Security; and Judge Evan Wallach of the United States Court of
International Trade all participated in this final panel of the conference.
Each panelist drew from personal and professional experiences to
contribute to the dialogue of how best to accomplish justice. Jonathan
Leiken's article, "Leaving Wonderland: Distinguishing Terrorism from

18 Robert Mirone, BringingSuit Against a ForeignSovereign, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
491 (2005).
19Alan Gerson, Merging InternationalHuman Rights Law with Personal Injury Law in

the FightAgainst Terrorism, 36 CASE W.

RES.

J. INT'L L. 495 (2005).
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Other Types of Crime, 20 leads the reader through his first experience as a
prosecutor in a terrorism case against the defendant Usama Sadik Ahmed
Abdel Whab. He describes the reactions of the jury members to Whab's
name and skin color in a post-September 11, 2001 New York,
contextualizing the framework in which prosecutors find themselves when
prosecuting defendants like Whab. Leiken argues that a bifurcated system
must be created that separates questions of national security from
accusations of terrorist activity, while dealing with both according to the
Constitution. "The system should provide due process to those accused of
terrorist acts: where judges participate and review the decisions of the
executive branch and the military. 2 1
Toni Locy offered a journalist's perspective, focusing on the problems
that the United States has encountered with the new military commission
system in her article, "The Trials of al Qaeda: Federal Court vs. Military
Commission. 2 2 Ms. Locy suggests that many of the commission's
problems stem from the Bush Administration's "desire to control the flow
of information in the name of protecting national security. 23 She gives
several examples where the U.S. approach to secrecy is both obsessive and
inconsistent, and discusses a host of other problems inherent to the military
commissions, including a lack of efficiency, archaic rules of military law,
and a general sense of drama and confusion.
Andrew McCarthy asks a very important question in his article,
"Terrorism on Trial: The Trials of al Qaeda" 24-"[c]an we provide trials for
accused terrorists that comport with American standards of justice,
notwithstanding the complex challenges inherent when national security is
at risk?" 25 His response is a resounding yes, based on the simple fact that
the criminal justice system "works" repeatedly over and over again, and he
further argues that the trials so far conducted of Islamic terrorists have fully
comported with American standards of due process. Mr. McCarthy
describes how he was once a member of an intellectual camp that believed
that Americans best displayed their enlightenment by offering the
protective cloak of the Constitution even to those who sought to destroy it.
However, today he feels that this idea is a dangerous delusion.
Furthermore, he argues that criminal trials alone are not the appropriate
remedy for terrorists and to this end he states that "[i]t sounds nice to say
20 Jonathan Leiken, Leaving Wonderland: Distinguishing Terrorismfrom Other Types of
Crime, 36 CASE W. RES. J.INT'L L. 501 (2005).

2I Id. at 504.
22 Toni Locy, The Trials of al Qaeda: Federal Court vs. Military Commission, 36 CASE

W. RES. J. INT'L L. 507 (2005).
23
Id.at 508.
24 Andrew McCarthy, Terrorism on Trial: The Trials ofal Qaeda,
36 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 513 (2005).
25 Id.
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we treat terrorists just like we treat everyone else, but if we really are doing
else is being treated worse, and that is not the system we
that, everyone
'26
aspire to.

Greg and Diana Noone conduct an assessment of military commissions
in their article, "The Military Commissions - A Possible Strength Giving
Way to a Probable Weakness - And the Required Fix. 27 To provide a lens
for their analysis, they posit a compelling question -- would the United
States accept or condemn its own military commission system if it were the
system of another country? The authors suggest several modifications in
order to remedy some of the starker problems of the current system
including: providing for appeals, interlocutory questions, and panel
challenges to the Court of Appeals for the Armed Services; constituting a
new panel with an elevated level of legal experience-ideally close to
retirement in order to increase their credibility based on their "untouchable"
status; and lastly a greater attention to fundamental rights required under
international law.
Professor Scott Silliman traces the history of military commissions in
his article, "On Military Commissions ' 28 and discusses the nature of their
creation, management, and general procedures with specific attention paid
to the military commissions of Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Echoing the
Noones' analysis, Professor Silliman highlights a major criticism of
military commissions-the lack of any provision for judicial review of
convictions-and notes the Bush administration's heavy reliance on the
1950 Supreme Court Eisentrager case to support its position that the
Constitution does not provide non-resident aliens with access to the U.S.
courts. Professor Silliman reminds us that the Supreme Court has not
revisited the constitutional ramifications of Eisentragerin light of "the war
against terrorism;" however, he states that if it does, the new ruling will
undoubtedly have a dramatic impact on the United States military
commission system.
In the final article in this Symposium Issue, "The Logical Nexus
Between the Decision to Deny Application of the Third Geneva Convention
to the Taliban and al Qaeda, and the Mistreatment of Prisoners in Abu
Ghraib" 29 Judge Evan Wallach examines the international law principles
embedded within the United States' decision to treat certain detainees as
26
27

Id.at 521.
Gregory P. Noone and Diana C. Noone, The Military Commissions - A Possible

Strength Giving Way to a Probable Weakness - And the Required Fix, 36 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 523 (2005).
28 Scott Silliman, On Military Commissions, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 529 (2005).
29 Evan J.Wallach, The Logical Nexus Between the Decision to Deny Application of the
Third Geneva Convention to the Taliban andal Qaeda, and the Mistreatment of Prisonersin
Abu Ghraib, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 541 (2005).
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unprotected by the 1949 Third Geneva Convention. In addition, Judge
Wallach conducts an in-depth analysis of the interrogation methods
employed at the Abu Ghraib prison and argues that the tactics used on
detainees may violate both international and domestic law.
We are extremely grateful to our distinguished panelists for their
participation in the "Terrorism on Trial" conference and contributing to this
Symposium Issue of the Case Journal of International Law. Our
appreciation also goes out to the student editors of this volume who worked
diligently on the preparation of this publication.
III
The "Terrorism on Trial" Symposium was also significant in that it
kicked off the establishment of Case School of Law's new Institute for
Global Security Law and Policy. Under the leadership of its Director,
Professor Amos Guiora, and Associate Director, Professor Jessie Hill, the
Institute, which will work in partnership with the Cox International Law
Center, seeks to become a leading research and resource center both
nationally and internationally concerning the defining issue of the dayterrorism-thereby significantly contributing to an on-going commitment to
globalization.
The Institute reflects Case's determination to stimulate and influence
public debate on the issues of security and counter-terrorism. The Institute
will address a wide variety of issues including the legal, financial, political,
social, religious, and cultural ramifications in this field, and will offer a
uniquely comprehensive hub for addressing these issues through a multifaceted approach that will blend theory with practical applications.
Under the auspices of the Institute, Case students have been providing
legal research memos to the Military Commissions prosecuting al Qaeda, in
an effort to address difficult legal issues and bring about the types of
reforms discussed in this Symposium Issue. In October 2005, the Institute
will co-sponsor a major conference with the Cox Center entitled "Torture
and the War on Terror," and in March 2006 the Institute, Cox Center, and
Law and Medicine Center will collectively host a unique simulation-based
bio-terrorism conference, with the articles from both events to be published
in upcoming issues of the Case Journalof InternationalLaw. Furthermore,
the Institute will launch a cutting edge web-site and perform research on a
project basis for NGO's and government agencies on issues such as
methods of interrupting terror financing; the effectiveness and limitations of
counter-terrorism; the role of intelligence in counter-terrorism; the balance
between civil liberties and domestic counter-terrorism activities; bioterrorism; and religion and terrorism.

